pve-edge-kernel/debian/patches/pve/0008-apparmor-af_unix-mediation.patch

From c59a2789cc146827c225f9f9035b9fc23a82fc45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 23:27:23 -0700
Subject: UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: af_unix mediation

af_socket mediation did not make it into 4.17 so add remaining out
of tree patch

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]>
---
 security/apparmor/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/apparmor/af_unix.c         | 652 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c      |   6 +
 security/apparmor/file.c            |   4 +-
 security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h | 114 +++++++
 security/apparmor/include/net.h     |   4 +
 security/apparmor/include/path.h    |   1 +
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h  |  10 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             | 112 +++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c             |  53 ++-
 10 files changed, 953 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/af_unix.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h

(limited to 'security/apparmor')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index ff23fcf..fad407f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o \
+              af_unix.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
 clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54b3796
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <net/tcp_states.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+
+static inline struct sock *aa_sock(struct unix_sock *u)
+{
+	return &u->sk;
+}
+
+static inline int unix_fs_perm(const char *op, u32 mask, struct aa_label *label,
+			       struct unix_sock *u, int flags)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!u);
+	AA_BUG(!UNIX_FS(aa_sock(u)));
+
+	if (unconfined(label) || !LABEL_MEDIATES(label, AA_CLASS_FILE))
+		return 0;
+
+	mask &= NET_FS_PERMS;
+	if (!u->path.dentry) {
+		struct path_cond cond = { };
+		struct aa_perms perms = { };
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+		/* socket path has been cleared because it is being shutdown
+		 * can only fall back to original sun_path request
+		 */
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(&u->sk);
+		if (ctx->path.dentry)
+			return aa_path_perm(op, label, &ctx->path, flags, mask,
+					    &cond);
+		return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			((flags | profile->path_flags) & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED) ?
+				__aa_path_perm(op, profile,
+					       u->addr->name->sun_path, mask,
+					       &cond, flags, &perms) :
+				aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, op, mask,
+					      u->addr->name->sun_path, NULL,
+					      NULL, cond.uid,
+					      "Failed name lookup - "
+					      "deleted entry", -EACCES));
+	} else {
+		/* the sunpath may not be valid for this ns so use the path */
+		struct path_cond cond = { u->path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+					  u->path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+		};
+
+		return aa_path_perm(op, label, &u->path, flags, mask, &cond);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* passing in state returned by PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF */
+static unsigned int match_to_prot(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				  unsigned int state, int type, int protocol,
+				  const char **info)
+{
+	__be16 buffer[2];
+	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(type);
+	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16(protocol);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
+				 4);
+	if (!state)
+		*info = "failed type and protocol match";
+	return state;
+}
+
+static unsigned int match_addr(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state,
+			       struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	if (addr)
+		/* include leading \0 */
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+					 addr->sun_path,
+					 unix_addr_len(addrlen));
+	else
+		/* anonymous end point */
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, "\x01",
+					 1);
+	/* todo change to out of band */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+	return state;
+}
+
+static unsigned int match_to_local(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				   unsigned int state, int type, int protocol,
+				   struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen,
+				   const char **info)
+{
+	state = match_to_prot(profile, state, type, protocol, info);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_addr(profile, state, addr, addrlen);
+		if (state) {
+			/* todo: local label matching */
+			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa,
+						       state);
+			if (!state)
+				*info = "failed local label match";
+		} else
+			*info = "failed local address match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static unsigned int match_to_sk(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				unsigned int state, struct unix_sock *u,
+				const char **info)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un *addr = NULL;
+	int addrlen = 0;
+
+	if (u->addr) {
+		addr = u->addr->name;
+		addrlen = u->addr->len;
+	}
+
+	return match_to_local(profile, state, u->sk.sk_type, u->sk.sk_protocol,
+			      addr, addrlen, info);
+}
+
+#define CMD_ADDR	1
+#define CMD_LISTEN	2
+#define CMD_OPT		4
+
+static inline unsigned int match_to_cmd(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					unsigned int state, struct unix_sock *u,
+					char cmd, const char **info)
+{
+	state = match_to_sk(profile, state, u, info);
+	if (state) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, &cmd, 1);
+		if (!state)
+			*info = "failed cmd selection match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int match_to_peer(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 unsigned int state,
+					 struct unix_sock *u,
+					 struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr,
+					 int peer_addrlen,
+					 const char **info)
+{
+	state = match_to_cmd(profile, state, u, CMD_ADDR, info);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_addr(profile, state, peer_addr, peer_addrlen);
+		if (!state)
+			*info = "failed peer address match";
+	}
+	return state;
+}
+
+static int do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state, u32 request,
+		    struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa,
+			      audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+static int match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *peer,
+			      unsigned int state, u32 request,
+			      struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!peer);
+
+	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
+
+	if (state) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+				     peer->base.hname);
+		if (!state)
+			aad(sa)->info = "failed peer label match";
+	}
+	return do_perms(profile, state, request, sa);
+}
+
+
+/* unix sock creation comes before we know if the socket will be an fs
+ * socket
+ * v6 - semantics are handled by mapping in profile load
+ * v7 - semantics require sock create for tasks creating an fs socket.
+ */
+static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
+			       int type, int protocol)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, OP_CREATE, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	if ((state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX))) {
+		state = match_to_prot(profile, state, type, protocol,
+				      &aad(&sa)->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, &sa);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+			int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	if (unconfined(label))
+		return 0;
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_create_perm(profile, family, type, protocol));
+}
+
+
+static inline int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
+				  u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_to_sk(profile, state, unix_sk(sk),
+				    &aad(&sa)->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, request, &sa);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+			  struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_sk_perm(profile, op, request, sk));
+}
+
+static int unix_label_sock_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+				struct socket *sock)
+{
+	if (unconfined(label))
+		return 0;
+	if (UNIX_FS(sock->sk))
+		return unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, unix_sk(sock->sk), 0);
+
+	return aa_unix_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr */
+int aa_unix_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = unix_label_sock_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			     struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, OP_BIND, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+	AA_BUG(unix_addr_fs(addr, addrlen));
+
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+	if (state) {
+		/* bind for abstract socket */
+		aad(&sa)->net.addr = unix_addr(addr);
+		aad(&sa)->net.addrlen = addrlen;
+
+		state = match_to_local(profile, state,
+				       sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol,
+				       unix_addr(addr), addrlen,
+				       &aad(&sa)->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_BIND, &sa);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, AA_MAY_BIND, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+		      int addrlen)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	 /* fs bind is handled by mknod */
+	if (!(unconfined(label) || unix_addr_fs(address, addrlen)))
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, address,
+						  addrlen));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+			 int addrlen)
+{
+	/* unix connections are covered by the
+	 * - unix_stream_connect (stream) and unix_may_send hooks (dgram)
+	 * - fs connect is handled by open
+	 */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			       int backlog)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, OP_LISTEN, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+	if (state) {
+		__be16 b = cpu_to_be16(backlog);
+
+		state = match_to_cmd(profile, state, unix_sk(sk), CMD_LISTEN,
+				     &aad(&sa)->info);
+		if (state) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &b, 2);
+			if (!state)
+				aad(&sa)->info = "failed listen backlog match";
+		}
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, &sa);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!(unconfined(label) || UNIX_FS(sock->sk)))
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk,
+						    backlog));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+static inline int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				      struct sock *sk,
+				      struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, OP_ACCEPT, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_to_sk(profile, state, unix_sk(sk),
+				    &aad(&sa)->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, &sa);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */
+int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!(unconfined(label) || UNIX_FS(sock->sk)))
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk,
+						    newsock->sk));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+/* dgram handled by unix_may_sendmsg, right to send on stream done at connect
+ * could do per msg unix_stream here
+ */
+/* sendmsg, recvmsg */
+int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk, int level, int optname)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+	if (state) {
+		__be16 b = cpu_to_be16(optname);
+
+		state = match_to_cmd(profile, state, unix_sk(sk), CMD_OPT,
+				     &aad(&sa)->info);
+		if (state) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &b, 2);
+			if (!state)
+				aad(&sa)->info = "failed sockopt match";
+		}
+		return do_perms(profile, state, request, &sa);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level,
+		     int optname)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!(unconfined(label) || UNIX_FS(sock->sk)))
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_opt_perm(profile, op, request,
+						 sock->sk, level, optname));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* null peer_label is allowed, in which case the peer_sk label is used */
+static int profile_peer_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, u32 request,
+			     struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+			     struct aa_label *peer_label,
+			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!peer_sk);
+	AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(peer_sk));
+
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+	if (state) {
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk);
+		struct aa_profile *peerp;
+		struct sockaddr_un *addr = NULL;
+		int len = 0;
+		if (unix_sk(peer_sk)->addr) {
+			addr = unix_sk(peer_sk)->addr->name;
+			len = unix_sk(peer_sk)->addr->len;
+		}
+		state = match_to_peer(profile, state, unix_sk(sk),
+				      addr, len, &aad(sa)->info);
+		if (!peer_label)
+			peer_label = peer_ctx->label;
+		return fn_for_each_in_ns(peer_label, peerp,
+				   match_label(profile, peerp, state, request,
+					       sa));
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, sa, request, sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Requires: lock held on both @sk and @peer_sk
+ */
+int aa_unix_peer_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+		      struct aa_label *peer_label)
+{
+	struct unix_sock *peeru = unix_sk(peer_sk);
+	struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!peer_sk);
+
+	if (UNIX_FS(aa_sock(peeru)))
+		return unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, peeru, 0);
+	else if (UNIX_FS(aa_sock(u)))
+		return unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, u, 0);
+	else {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+		aad(&sa)->net.peer_sk = peer_sk;
+
+		/* TODO: ns!!! */
+		if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), sock_net(peer_sk))) {
+			;
+		}
+
+		if (unconfined(label))
+			return 0;
+
+		return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_peer_perm(profile, op, request, sk,
+						  peer_sk, peer_label, &sa));
+	}
+}
+
+
+/* from net/unix/af_unix.c */
+static void unix_state_double_lock(struct sock *sk1, struct sock *sk2)
+{
+	if (unlikely(sk1 == sk2) || !sk2) {
+		unix_state_lock(sk1);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sk1 < sk2) {
+		unix_state_lock(sk1);
+		unix_state_lock_nested(sk2);
+	} else {
+		unix_state_lock(sk2);
+		unix_state_lock_nested(sk1);
+	}
+}
+
+static void unix_state_double_unlock(struct sock *sk1, struct sock *sk2)
+{
+	if (unlikely(sk1 == sk2) || !sk2) {
+		unix_state_unlock(sk1);
+		return;
+	}
+	unix_state_unlock(sk1);
+	unix_state_unlock(sk2);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct sock *peer_sk = NULL;
+	u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(sock->sk->sk_family != AF_UNIX);
+
+	/* TODO: update sock label with new task label */
+	unix_state_lock(sock->sk);
+	peer_sk = unix_peer(sock->sk);
+	if (peer_sk)
+		sock_hold(peer_sk);
+	if (!unix_connected(sock) && sk_req) {
+		error = unix_label_sock_perm(label, op, sk_req, sock);
+		if (!error) {
+			// update label
+		}
+	}
+	unix_state_unlock(sock->sk);
+	if (!peer_sk)
+		return error;
+
+	unix_state_double_lock(sock->sk, peer_sk);
+	if (UNIX_FS(sock->sk)) {
+		error = unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, unix_sk(sock->sk),
+				     PATH_SOCK_COND);
+	} else if (UNIX_FS(peer_sk)) {
+		error = unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, unix_sk(peer_sk),
+				     PATH_SOCK_COND);
+	} else {
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk);
+		if (sk_req)
+			error = aa_unix_label_sk_perm(label, op, sk_req,
+						      sock->sk);
+		last_error(error,
+			xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(label, op,
+						 MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
+						 sock->sk, peer_sk, NULL),
+			       aa_unix_peer_perm(pctx->label, op,
+						 MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
+						 peer_sk, sock->sk, label)));
+	}
+
+	unix_state_double_unlock(sock->sk, peer_sk);
+	sock_put(peer_sk);
+
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 0aef8e3..d581800 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2346,6 +2346,11 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_dbus[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "acquire send receive"),
+	{ }
+};
+
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query_label[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("perms", "allow deny audit quiet"),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("data",		1),
@@ -2370,6 +2375,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("caps",			aa_sfs_entry_caps),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace",			aa_sfs_entry_ptrace),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("signal",			aa_sfs_entry_signal),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("dbus",			aa_sfs_entry_dbus),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("query",			aa_sfs_entry_query),
 	{ }
 };
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index e1b7e936..866272c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
@@ -271,7 +272,8 @@ int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
 {
 	int e = 0;
 
-	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+	    ((flags & PATH_SOCK_COND) && !PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX)))
 		return 0;
 	aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond, perms);
 	if (request & ~perms->allow)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1b7f23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2014 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+#ifndef __AA_AF_UNIX_H
+
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+
+#include "label.h"
+//#include "include/net.h"
+
+#define unix_addr_len(L) ((L) - sizeof(sa_family_t))
+#define unix_abstract_name_len(L) (unix_addr_len(L) - 1)
+#define unix_abstract_len(U) (unix_abstract_name_len((U)->addr->len))
+#define addr_unix_abstract_name(B) ((B)[0] == 0)
+#define addr_unix_anonymous(U) (addr_unix_len(U) <= 0)
+#define addr_unix_abstract(U) (!addr_unix_anonymous(U) && addr_unix_abstract_name((U)->addr))
+//#define unix_addr_fs(U) (!unix_addr_anonymous(U) && !unix_addr_abstract_name((U)->addr))
+
+#define unix_addr(A) ((struct sockaddr_un *)(A))
+#define unix_addr_anon(A, L) ((A) && unix_addr_len(L) <= 0)
+#define unix_addr_fs(A, L) (!unix_addr_anon(A, L) && !addr_unix_abstract_name(unix_addr(A)->sun_path))
+
+#define UNIX_ANONYMOUS(U) (!unix_sk(U)->addr)
+/* from net/unix/af_unix.c */
+#define UNIX_ABSTRACT(U) (!UNIX_ANONYMOUS(U) &&				\
+			  unix_sk(U)->addr->hash < UNIX_HASH_SIZE)
+#define UNIX_FS(U) (!UNIX_ANONYMOUS(U) && unix_sk(U)->addr->name->sun_path[0])
+#define unix_peer(sk) (unix_sk(sk)->peer)
+#define unix_connected(S) ((S)->state == SS_CONNECTED)
+
+static inline void print_unix_addr(struct sockaddr_un *A, int L)
+{
+	char *buf = (A) ? (char *) &(A)->sun_path : NULL;
+	int len = unix_addr_len(L);
+	if (!buf || len <= 0)
+		printk(" <anonymous>");
+	else if (buf[0])
+		printk(" %s", buf);
+	else
+		/* abstract name len includes leading \0 */
+		printk(" %d @%.*s", len - 1, len - 1, buf+1);
+};
+
+/*
+	printk("%s: %s: f %d, t %d, p %d", __FUNCTION__,		\
+	       #SK ,							\
+*/
+#define print_unix_sk(SK)						\
+do {									\
+	struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(SK);				\
+	printk("%s: f %d, t %d, p %d",	#SK ,				\
+	       (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, (SK)->sk_protocol);	\
+	if (u->addr)							\
+		print_unix_addr(u->addr->name, u->addr->len);		\
+	else								\
+		print_unix_addr(NULL, sizeof(sa_family_t));		\
+	/* printk("\n");*/						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define print_sk(SK)							\
+do {									\
+	if (!(SK)) {							\
+		printk("%s: %s is null\n", __FUNCTION__, #SK);		\
+	} else if ((SK)->sk_family == PF_UNIX) {			\
+		print_unix_sk(SK);					\
+		printk("\n");						\
+	} else {							\
+		printk("%s: %s: family %d\n", __FUNCTION__, #SK ,	\
+		       (SK)->sk_family);				\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+#define print_sock_addr(U) \
+do {			       \
+	printk("%s:\n", __FUNCTION__);					\
+	printk("    sock %s:", sock_ctx && sock_ctx->label ? aa_label_printk(sock_ctx->label, GFP_ATOMIC); : "<null>"); print_sk(sock); \
+	printk("    other %s:", other_ctx && other_ctx->label ? aa_label_printk(other_ctx->label, GFP_ATOMIC); : "<null>"); print_sk(other); \
+	printk("    new %s", new_ctx && new_ctx->label ? aa_label_printk(new_ctx->label, GFP_ATOMIC); : "<null>"); print_sk(newsk); \
+} while (0)
+
+
+
+
+int aa_unix_peer_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+		      struct aa_label *peer_label);
+int aa_unix_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+			  struct sock *sk);
+int aa_unix_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock);
+int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+			int protocol);
+int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+		      int addrlen);
+int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+			 int addrlen);
+int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     struct msghdr *msg, int size);
+int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level,
+		     int optname);
+int aa_unix_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock);
+
+#endif /* __AA_AF_UNIX_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 98a42ef..b4044fa 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 struct aa_sk_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *label;
 	struct aa_label *peer;
+	struct path path;
 };
 
 #define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
@@ -83,6 +84,9 @@ struct aa_net_compat {
 ({						\
 	int __e;				\
 	switch ((FAMILY)) {			\
+	case AF_UNIX:				\
+		__e = aa_unix_ ## FN;		\
+		break;				\
 	default:				\
 		__e = DEF_FN;			\
 	}					\
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
index 44a7945..44592cd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 enum path_flags {
 	PATH_IS_DIR = 0x1,		/* path is a directory */
+	PATH_SOCK_COND = 0x2,
 	PATH_CONNECT_PATH = 0x4,	/* connect disconnected paths to / */
 	PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8,		/* do path lookup relative to chroot */
 	PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10,	/* connect paths that are at ns root */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index f904105..f1c9cdc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -230,9 +230,13 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
 	__be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
 
-	if (!state)
-		return 0;
-	return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+	if (!state) {
+		state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET_COMPAT);
+		if (!state)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+	return state;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index f72406f..59a8ddd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
 
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
@@ -801,6 +802,7 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 	SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
 	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
+	path_put(&ctx->path);
 	kfree(ctx);
 }
 
@@ -820,6 +822,99 @@ static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 	if (new->peer)
 		aa_put_label(new->peer);
 	new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
+	new->path = ctx->path;
+	path_get(&new->path);
+}
+
+static struct path *UNIX_FS_CONN_PATH(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	if (sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX && UNIX_FS(sk))
+		return &unix_sk(sk)->path;
+	else if (newsk->sk_family == PF_UNIX && UNIX_FS(newsk))
+		return &unix_sk(newsk)->path;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn
+ *
+ * peer is locked when this hook is called
+ */
+static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+					struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = SK_CTX(newsk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct path *path;
+	int error;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_unix_peer_perm(label, OP_CONNECT,
+				(AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
+				  sk, peer_sk, NULL);
+	if (!UNIX_FS(peer_sk)) {
+		last_error(error,
+			aa_unix_peer_perm(peer_ctx->label, OP_CONNECT,
+				(AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
+				peer_sk, sk, label));
+	}
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* label newsk if it wasn't labeled in post_create. Normally this
+	 * would be done in sock_graft, but because we are directly looking
+	 * at the peer_sk to obtain peer_labeling for unix socks this
+	 * does not work
+	 */
+	if (!new_ctx->label)
+		new_ctx->label = aa_get_label(peer_ctx->label);
+
+	/* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
+	if (new_ctx->peer)
+		aa_put_label(new_ctx->peer);
+
+	if (sk_ctx->peer)
+		aa_put_label(sk_ctx->peer);
+
+	new_ctx->peer = aa_get_label(sk_ctx->label);
+	sk_ctx->peer = aa_get_label(peer_ctx->label);
+
+	path = UNIX_FS_CONN_PATH(sk, peer_sk);
+	if (path) {
+		new_ctx->path = *path;
+		sk_ctx->path = *path;
+		path_get(path);
+		path_get(path);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams
+ *
+ * other is locked when this hook is called
+ *
+ * dgram connect calls may_send, peer setup but path not copied?????
+ */
+static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer->sk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
+					 sock->sk, peer->sk, NULL),
+		       aa_unix_peer_perm(peer_ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG,
+					 AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
+					 peer->sk, sock->sk, label));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1065,11 +1160,25 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
 {
+	struct sock *peer_sk;
 	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
 
 	if (ctx->peer)
 		return ctx->peer;
 
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+
+	/* check for sockpair peering which does not go through
+	 * security_unix_stream_connect
+	 */
+	peer_sk = unix_peer(sk);
+	if (peer_sk) {
+		ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk);
+		if (ctx->label)
+			return ctx->label;
+	}
+
 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
 }
 
@@ -1216,6 +1325,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send),
+
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index e693df8..e2e759b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  */
 
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 
 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network_compat[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -71,6 +73,36 @@ static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 	"unknown",
 };
 
+static void audit_unix_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			    struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	int len = unix_addr_len(addrlen);
+
+	if (!addr || len <= 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=none", str);
+	} else if (addr->sun_path[0]) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", str);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, addr->sun_path);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"@", str);
+		if (audit_string_contains_control(&addr->sun_path[1], len - 1))
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, &addr->sun_path[1], len - 1);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%.*s", len - 1,
+					 &addr->sun_path[1]);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_unix_sk_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			       struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+	if (u && u->addr)
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, u->addr->name, u->addr->len);
+	else
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, NULL, 0);
+}
 
 /* audit callback for net specific fields */
 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
@@ -102,6 +134,23 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 		}
 	}
+	if (sa->u.net->family == AF_UNIX) {
+		if ((aad(sa)->request & ~NET_PEER_MASK) && aad(sa)->net.addr)
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "addr",
+					unix_addr(aad(sa)->net.addr),
+					aad(sa)->net.addrlen);
+		else
+			audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "addr", sa->u.net->sk);
+		if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PEER_MASK) {
+			if (aad(sa)->net.addr)
+				audit_unix_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+						unix_addr(aad(sa)->net.addr),
+						aad(sa)->net.addrlen);
+			else
+				audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+						   aad(sa)->net.peer_sk);
+		}
+	}
 	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
 		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
@@ -202,7 +251,9 @@ int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
 	AA_BUG(!sock);
 	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 
-	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 file_perm(label, op, request, sock),
+			 aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk));
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK