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@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
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-!!! quote "Changes in sing-box 1.8.0"
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+---
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+icon: material/alert-decagram
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+---
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+
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+!!! quote "Changes in sing-box 1.10.0"
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:material-alert-decagram: [utls](#utls)
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@@ -210,28 +214,25 @@ The path to the server private key, in PEM format.
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==Client only==
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-!!! note ""
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-
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- uTLS is poorly maintained and the effect may be unproven, use at your own risk.
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+!!! failure ""
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+
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+ There is no evidence that GFW detects and blocks servers based on TLS client fingerprinting, and using an imperfect emulation that has not been security reviewed could pose security risks.
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uTLS is a fork of "crypto/tls", which provides ClientHello fingerprinting resistance.
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Available fingerprint values:
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-!!! question "Since sing-box 1.8.0"
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+!!! warning "Removed since sing-box 1.10.0"
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+
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+ Some legacy chrome fingerprints have been removed and will fallback to chrome:
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- :material-plus: chrome_psk
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- :material-plus: chrome_psk_shuffle
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- :material-plus: chrome_padding_psk_shuffle
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- :material-plus: chrome_pq
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- :material-plus: chrome_pq_psk
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+ :material-close: chrome_psk
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+ :material-close: chrome_psk_shuffle
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+ :material-close: chrome_padding_psk_shuffle
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+ :material-close: chrome_pq
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+ :material-close: chrome_pq_psk
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* chrome
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-* chrome_psk
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-* chrome_psk_shuffle
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-* chrome_padding_psk_shuffle
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-* chrome_pq
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-* chrome_pq_psk
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* firefox
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* edge
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* safari
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