OpenSSL 1.0.2e

Source commit: df493cee14fbc09c5e8a9b776d0da3351e9a162f

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c

@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 
+#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
+#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
+#endif
+
 static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
                            int indent);
 static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
 #else
     dump_indent = 6;            /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
 #endif
+
+    if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
+            BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+            return 0;
+    }
+
     p = *pp;
     tot = p + length;
     op = p - 1;

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c

@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
                          long length)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *ret;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pp;
 
     if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
         if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
     }
 
     if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
-        !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
+        !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
         if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
             PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
-            p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
+            p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
             if (!p8)
                 goto err;
             EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
             ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
             PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
-
+            if (ret == NULL)
+                goto err;
         } else {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
             goto err;
         }
     }
+    *pp = p;
     if (a != NULL)
         (*a) = ret;
     return (ret);
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
      * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
      */
     inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
+    p = *pp;
     /*
      * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
      * can just count the elements.
@@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
         keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
     else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
                                               * traditional format */
-        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
         EVP_PKEY *ret;
 
         sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
@@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
         }
         ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
         PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        *pp = p;
         if (a) {
             *a = ret;
         }

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
     int otag;
     int ret = 0;
     ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+    int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+    aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
     if (!pval)
         return 0;
     if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@@ -350,9 +352,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
         }
 
         asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
-        *in = p;
         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
             goto auxerr;
+        *in = p;
         return 1;
 
     case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
@@ -489,9 +491,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
         /* Save encoding */
         if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
             goto auxerr;
-        *in = p;
         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
             goto auxerr;
+        *in = p;
         return 1;
 
     default:
@@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
  auxerr:
     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
  err:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    if (combine == 0)
+        ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
     if (errtt)
         ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
                            ", Type=", it->sname);
@@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
     } else {
         /* Nothing special */
         ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-                               -1, 0, opt, ctx);
+                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
         if (!ret) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             goto err;

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c

@@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
                   int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
     BIGNUM *bn;
-    if (!*pval)
-        bn_new(pval, it);
+
+    if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
+        return 0;
     bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
     if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
         bn_free(pval, it);

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c

@@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
 {
     X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
     EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
-    xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    q = *pp;
+    xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
     if (!xpk)
         return NULL;
     pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
     X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
     if (!pktmp)
         return NULL;
+    *pp = q;
     if (a) {
         EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
         *a = pktmp;

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c

@@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
     if (!a || *a == NULL) {
         freeret = 1;
     }
-    ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
+    ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
     /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
     if (!ret)
         return NULL;
     /* update length */
-    length -= *pp - q;
-    if (!length)
-        return ret;
-    if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
+    length -= q - *pp;
+    if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
         goto err;
+    *pp = q;
     return ret;
  err:
     if (freeret) {

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c

@@ -163,10 +163,13 @@ int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
     if (!(objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)))
         return 0;
     if (!(aux = aux_get(x)))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
     if (!aux->reject && !(aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
     return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp);
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x)

libs/openssl/crypto/bio/b_dump.c

@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
     if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
         rows++;
     for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
-        buf[0] = '\0';          /* start with empty string */
         BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
         BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
         BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);

libs/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c

@@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
     NULL,
 };
 
-BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
 {
-    BIO *ret;
     FILE *file = NULL;
 
 #  if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
@@ -164,6 +163,14 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
 #  else
     file = fopen(filename, mode);
 #  endif
+    return (file);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+    BIO  *ret;
+    FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode);
+
     if (file == NULL) {
         SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
         ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
@@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
         else
             strcat(p, "t");
 #  endif
-        fp = fopen(ptr, p);
+        fp = file_fopen(ptr, p);
         if (fp == NULL) {
             SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
             ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c

@@ -662,12 +662,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
     bn_check_top(p);
     bn_check_top(m);
 
-    top = m->top;
-
-    if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
+    if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
         return (0);
     }
+
+    top = m->top;
+
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
     if (bits == 0) {
         ret = BN_one(rr);

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c

@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
          * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
          */
         pB = &local_B;
+        local_B.flags = 0;
         BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
         if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
             goto err;
@@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
          * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
          */
         pA = &local_A;
+        local_A.flags = 0;
         BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
         /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c

@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
     bn_check_top(a);
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
     if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
     if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
         goto err;
 
@@ -699,18 +699,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
         int top = p->top;
         BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
 
-        bn_wexpand(u, top);
+        if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
+            goto err;
         udp = u->d;
         for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
             udp[i] = 0;
         u->top = top;
-        bn_wexpand(b, top);
+        if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
+          goto err;
         bdp = b->d;
         bdp[0] = 1;
         for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
             bdp[i] = 0;
         b->top = top;
-        bn_wexpand(c, top);
+        if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
+          goto err;
         cdp = c->d;
         for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
             cdp[i] = 0;

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c

@@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (mont == NULL)
         return;
 
-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
     if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
     int ret = 0;
     BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
 
+    if (BN_is_zero(mod))
+        return 0;
+
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
     if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
         goto err;

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c

@@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
 
     if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
         BN_zero(d);
-        if (!BN_copy(r, m))
+        if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
+            BN_CTX_end(ctx);
             return 0;
+        }
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
         return (1);
     }

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c

@@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
      * exceeded.
      */
     if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
     t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 
     for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
         if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
-            return 0;
+            goto err;
         /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
         BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
         if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
     return 0;
 
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h

@@ -1,32 +1,44 @@
-/******************************************************************************
-* Copyright(c) 2012, Intel Corp.
-* Developers and authors:
-* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
-* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
-* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
+/*****************************************************************************
+*                                                                            *
+*  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     *
+*                                                                            *
+*  All rights reserved.                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        *
+*  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    *
+*  met:                                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    *
+*     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 *
+*     distribution.                                                          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         *
+*     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   *
+*     this software without specific prior written permission.               *
+*                                                                            *
+*                                                                            *
+*  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          *
+*  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         *
+*  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        *
+*  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            *
+*  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     *
+*  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       *
+*  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        *
+*  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    *
+*  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      *
+*  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        *
+*  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              *
+*                                                                            *
 ******************************************************************************
-* LICENSE:
-* This submission to OpenSSL is to be made available under the OpenSSL
-* license, and only to the OpenSSL project, in order to allow integration
-* into the publicly distributed code.
-* The use of this code, or portions of this code, or concepts embedded in
-* this code, or modification of this code and/or algorithm(s) in it, or the
-* use of this code for any other purpose than stated above, requires special
-* licensing.
-******************************************************************************
-* DISCLAIMER:
-* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS
-* ``AS IS''. ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
-* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR THE COPYRIGHT
-* OWNERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
-* OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
-* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
-* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
-* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
-* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-******************************************************************************/
+* Developers and authors:                                                    *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            *
+*****************************************************************************/
 
 #ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
 # define RSAZ_EXP_H

libs/openssl/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
 size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
 char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
 {
     if (str == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
     return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
 }
 
@@ -81,16 +82,22 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
     char *ret;
 
     if (str == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
 
     siz = BUF_strnlen(str, siz);
 
+    if (siz >= INT_MAX)
+        return NULL;
+
     ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
     if (ret == NULL) {
         BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
     }
-    BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
+
+    memcpy(ret, str, siz);
+    ret[siz] = '\0';
+
     return (ret);
 }
 
@@ -98,13 +105,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
 {
     void *ret;
 
-    if (data == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
+    if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
+        return NULL;
 
     ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
     if (ret == NULL) {
         BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
     }
     return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
 }

libs/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h

@@ -86,7 +86,13 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
 int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
 size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
 char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
+
+/*
+ * Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
+ * first |siz| bytes of |str|.
+ */
 char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
+
 void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
 void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
 

libs/openssl/crypto/buildinf.h

@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@
   /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
   #define CFLAGS "compiler: cl  /MD /Ox /O2 /Ob2 -DOPENSSL_THREADS  -DDSO_WIN32  -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I. -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE    "
   #define PLATFORM "VC-WIN32"
-  #define DATE "Mon Jul 20 11:12:05 2015"
+  #define DATE "Tue Dec  8 16:01:54 2015"
 #endif
 #ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_BC_NT
   /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
   #define CFLAGS "compiler: bcc32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -O2 -ff -fp -DBN_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE    "
   #define PLATFORM "BC-NT"
-  #define DATE "Mon Jul 20 11:12:05 2015"
+  #define DATE "Tue Dec  8 16:01:54 2015"
 #endif

libs/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
     ok = 1;
 
  err:
-    if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
+    if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
         OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
         OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
         ec->key = NULL;

libs/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 
     /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
     encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (encalg == NULL) {
+        goto merr;
+    }
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
     if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {

libs/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c

@@ -857,6 +857,8 @@ int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain)
     } else {
         const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&mctx);
         pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL);
+        if (pkctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
         if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0)
             goto err;
         if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)

libs/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
     BIO *cmsbio;
     int ret = 0;
     if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
-        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
         return 0;
     }
 

libs/openssl/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c

@@ -404,8 +404,9 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
 void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
 {
 #ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
-    if (zlib_dso)
+    if (zlib_dso != NULL)
         DSO_free(zlib_dso);
+    zlib_dso = NULL;
 #endif
 }
 

libs/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c

@@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
         goto err;
     }
 
-    section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
+    section = BUF_strdup("default");
     if (section == NULL) {
         CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
     }
-    BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);
 
     if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
         CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

libs/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c

@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
     CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
                                CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
                                CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+    openssl_configured = 1;
 }
 
 void OPENSSL_no_config()

libs/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c

@@ -953,13 +953,29 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
 # if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
     /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
     if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
-        HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL"));
-        const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
-        ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0);
-        DeregisterEventSource(h);
+        HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
+
+        if (hEventLog != NULL) {
+            const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
+
+            if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
+                             1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+                /*
+                 * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
+                 * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
+                 * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
+                 * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
+                 */
+                OutputDebugString(pmsg);
+#endif
+            }
+
+            (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
+        }
     } else
 # endif
-        MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP);
+        MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
 }
 #else
 void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)

libs/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct dh_st {
     BIGNUM *p;
     BIGNUM *g;
     long length;                /* optional */
-    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x */
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x % p */
     BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x */
     int flags;
     BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;

libs/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c

@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
     ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))

libs/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c

@@ -114,16 +114,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
     }
 # endif
     else {
-        const EVP_MD *evpmd;
-        size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
-
-        if (bits >= 2048) {
-            qbits = 256;
-            evpmd = EVP_sha256();
-        } else {
-            qbits = 160;
-            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
-        }
+        const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+        size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
 
         return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
                                     seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
@@ -176,13 +168,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
     if (seed_in != NULL)
         memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
 
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
     r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
     g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
     W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -203,7 +196,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
             if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
                 goto err;
 
-            if (!seed_len) {
+            if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
                 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
                     goto err;
                 seed_is_random = 1;

libs/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum {
         /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
          *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
     POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
-        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02  */
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04  */
     POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
         /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
          *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */

libs/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c

@@ -970,8 +970,9 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
 {
     EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
     ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
 
-    if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
+    if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
         ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
         ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
         return NULL;
@@ -989,6 +990,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
         *a = group;
 
     ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+    *in = p;
     return (group);
 }
 
@@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
     int ok = 0;
     EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
     EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
 
-    if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
+    if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
         ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
         return NULL;
     }
@@ -1096,6 +1099,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
 
     if (a)
         *a = ret;
+    *in = p;
     ok = 1;
  err:
     if (!ok) {

libs/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c

@@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
     EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-    int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+    int ok = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+#endif
 
     if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
@@ -382,14 +385,15 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
     if (!point)
         goto err;
 
+    tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
 
     if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
         is_char_two = 1;
 
-    tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     if (is_char_two) {
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
                                                   x, y, ctx))

libs/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ void *ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx);
  *  \return pointer to a ECDSA_METHOD structure or NULL if an error occurred
  */
 
-ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method);
+ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(const ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method);
 
 /** frees a ECDSA_METHOD structure
  *  \param  ecdsa_method  pointer to the ECDSA_METHOD structure

libs/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c

@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ void *ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx)
     return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ecdsa->ex_data, idx));
 }
 
-ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth)
+ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(const ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth)
 {
     ECDSA_METHOD *ret;
 

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c

@@ -498,7 +498,18 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
             iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
 #  if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+        /*
+         * Assembly stitch handles AVX-capable processors, but its
+         * performance is not optimal on AMD Jaguar, ~40% worse, for
+         * unknown reasons. Incidentally processor in question supports
+         * AVX, but not AMD-specific XOP extension, which can be used
+         * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
+         * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
+         * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
+         */
         if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */
+            ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */
+             | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) &&    /* "Intel CPU"? */
             plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
             (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
             SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
@@ -816,8 +827,6 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
             if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
                 return -1;
 
-            len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
-
             if (ctx->encrypt) {
                 key->payload_length = len;
                 if ((key->aux.tls_ver =

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c

@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 # endif
 # ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
     if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1)
-        ! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2))
+        || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2))
         return 0;
 # else
     DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c

@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
 #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 # define conv_bin2ascii(a)       (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
-# define conv_ascii2bin(a)       (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f])
 #else
 /*
  * We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
  * as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
  */
 # define conv_bin2ascii(a)       (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
-# define conv_ascii2bin(a)       (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f])
 #endif
 
 /*-
@@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
 #define B64_WS                  0xE0
 #define B64_ERROR               0xFF
 #define B64_NOT_BASE64(a)       (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
+#define B64_BASE64(a)           !B64_NOT_BASE64(a)
 
 static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
     0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
@@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
     0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
 };
 
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+    if (a & 0x80)
+        return B64_ERROR;
+    return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#else
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+    a = os_toascii[a];
+    if (a & 0x80)
+        return B64_ERROR;
+    return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#endif
+
 void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
 {
     ctx->length = 48;
@@ -218,8 +235,9 @@ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
 
 void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    ctx->length = 30;
+    /* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
     ctx->num = 0;
+    ctx->length = 0;
     ctx->line_num = 0;
     ctx->expect_nl = 0;
 }
@@ -228,139 +246,123 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
  * -1 for error
  *  0 for last line
  *  1 for full line
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
+ * content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
+ * in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
+ * rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
+ * content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
+ * we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
+ *   - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
+ *   - Input has zero-length.
+ * -1 is returned if:
+ *   - Invalid characters are detected.
+ *   - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
+ *   - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
  */
 int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
 {
-    int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl;
+    int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
     unsigned char *d;
 
     n = ctx->num;
     d = ctx->enc_data;
-    ln = ctx->line_num;
-    exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
 
-    /* last line of input. */
-    if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) {
+    if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
+        eof++;
+        if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
+            eof++;
+    }
+
+     /* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
+    if (inl == 0) {
         rv = 0;
         goto end;
     }
 
-    /* We parse the input data */
     for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
-        /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream a lot */
-        if (ln >= 80) {
-            rv = -1;
-            goto end;
-        }
-
-        /* Get char and put it into the buffer */
         tmp = *(in++);
         v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
-        /* only save the good data :-) */
-        if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
-            OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
-            d[n++] = tmp;
-            ln++;
-        } else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
+        if (v == B64_ERROR) {
             rv = -1;
             goto end;
         }
 
-        /*
-         * have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line.  seof
-         * will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how
-         * many characters to chop off.
-         */
         if (tmp == '=') {
-            if (seof == -1)
-                seof = n;
             eof++;
+        } else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
+            /* More data after padding. */
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
         }
 
-        if (v == B64_CR) {
-            ln = 0;
-            if (exp_nl)
-                continue;
+        if (eof > 2) {
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
         }
 
-        /* eoln */
-        if (v == B64_EOLN) {
-            ln = 0;
-            if (exp_nl) {
-                exp_nl = 0;
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
-        exp_nl = 0;
-
-        /*
-         * If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process
-         * it.
-         */
-        if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
-            v = B64_EOF;
-            /*
-             * In case things were given us in really small records (so two
-             * '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the
-             * incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the
-             * count
-             */
-            eof = 0;
-            if (d[n - 1] == '=')
-                eof++;
-            if (d[n - 2] == '=')
-                eof++;
-            /* There will never be more than two '=' */
+        if (v == B64_EOF) {
+            seof = 1;
+            goto tail;
         }
 
-        if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) {
-            /*
-             * This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines.  We
-             * process the line and then need to accept the '\n'
-             */
-            if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64))
-                exp_nl = 1;
-            if (n > 0) {
-                v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
-                n = 0;
-                if (v < 0) {
-                    rv = 0;
-                    goto end;
-                }
-                if (eof > v) {
-                    rv = -1;
-                    goto end;
-                }
-                ret += (v - eof);
-            } else {
-                eof = 1;
-                v = 0;
+        /* Only save valid base64 characters. */
+        if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
+            if (n >= 64) {
+                /*
+                 * We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
+                 * we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
+                 * manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
+                 */
+                rv = -1;
+                goto end;
             }
+            OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+            d[n++] = tmp;
+        }
 
-            /*
-             * This is the case where we have had a short but valid input
-             * line
-             */
-            if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) {
-                rv = 0;
+        if (n == 64) {
+            decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+            n = 0;
+            if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+                rv = -1;
                 goto end;
-            } else
-                ctx->length = v;
+            }
+            ret += decoded_len - eof;
+            out += decoded_len - eof;
+        }
+    }
 
-            if (seof >= 0) {
-                rv = 0;
+    /*
+     * Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
+     * 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
+     * behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
+     */
+tail:
+    if (n > 0) {
+        if ((n & 3) == 0) {
+            decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+            n = 0;
+            if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+                rv = -1;
                 goto end;
             }
-            out += v;
+            ret += (decoded_len - eof);
+        } else if (seof) {
+            /* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
         }
     }
-    rv = 1;
- end:
+
+    rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
+end:
+    /* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
     *outl = ret;
     ctx->num = n;
-    ctx->line_num = ln;
-    ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
     return (rv);
 }
 

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c

@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
     if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
         prompt = prompt_string;
     ui = UI_new();
+    if (ui == NULL)
+        return -1;
     UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
                         (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
     if (verify)
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
     for (;;) {
         if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
-            return 0;
+            goto err;
         if (addmd++)
             if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
                 goto err;
@@ -188,6 +190,6 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
     rv = type->key_len;
  err:
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
     return rv;
 }

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c

@@ -72,11 +72,22 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
     if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
         ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
     else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) {
-            ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+        switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+        case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(c) == NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap)
+                ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
             ret = 1;
-        } else
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+
+        default:
             ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
+        }
     } else
         ret = -1;
     return (ret);
@@ -89,9 +100,22 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
     if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
         ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
     else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
-            return 1;
-        ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
+        switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
+            ret = 1;
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
+            break;
+        }
     } else
         ret = -1;
     return (ret);

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c

@@ -228,12 +228,16 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
                          int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
 {
     EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
-    if (!pbe_algs)
+
+    if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
         pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
-    if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
+        if (pbe_algs == NULL)
+            goto err;
     }
+
+    if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
     pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
     pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
     pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
@@ -242,6 +246,10 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
 
     sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
     return 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c

@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
 
 int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
 {
-    if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
+    if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
         return 0;
     pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
     return (key != NULL);

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c

@@ -96,12 +96,17 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (!ppkey)
+    if (ppkey == NULL)
         return -1;
 
-    if (!*ppkey)
+    if (*ppkey == NULL)
         *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
 
+    if (*ppkey == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
     if (ret <= 0) {
         EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);

libs/openssl/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c

@@ -108,9 +108,14 @@ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
     os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
     if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
-        return 0;
-    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os);
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
+        goto err;
     return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)

libs/openssl/crypto/mem_clr.c

@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
 {
     unsigned char *p = ptr;
     size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
+
+    if (ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+
     while (loop--) {
         *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
         ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));

libs/openssl/crypto/modes/wrap128.c

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
         return 0;
     A = B;
     t = 1;
-    memcpy(out + 8, in, inlen);
+    memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
     if (!iv)
         iv = default_iv;
 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
     A = B;
     t = 6 * (inlen >> 3);
     memcpy(A, in, 8);
-    memcpy(out, in + 8, inlen);
+    memmove(out, in + 8, inlen);
     for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
         R = out + inlen - 8;
         for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8) {

libs/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c

@@ -246,12 +246,6 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
     if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
         *p = 0;
         port = p + 1;
-    } else {
-        /* Not found: set default port */
-        if (*pssl)
-            port = "443";
-        else
-            port = "80";
     }
 
     *pport = BUF_strdup(port);

libs/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c

@@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
         return 1;
     }
 
-    i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response);
-    if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)))
+    if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
         goto err;
     rd = br->tbsResponseData;
     l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);

libs/openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h

@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ extern "C" {
    optimization options.  Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
    there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
  
-#if defined( sun )		/* Newer Sparc's */
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun )		/* Newer Sparc's */
 #  define DES_PTR
 #  define DES_RISC1
 #  define DES_UNROLL

libs/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000204fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000205fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2d-fips 9 Jul 2015"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2e-fips 3 Dec 2015"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2d 9 Jul 2015"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

libs/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c

@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
             xi->enc_len = 0;
 
             xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+            if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+                goto err;
             ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
             pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
             if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
@@ -193,6 +195,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
             xi->enc_len = 0;
 
             xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+            if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+                goto err;
             ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
             pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
             if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
@@ -214,6 +218,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
             xi->enc_len = 0;
 
             xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+            if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+                goto err;
             ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
             pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
             if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */

libs/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c

@@ -624,13 +624,11 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
             return 0;
         }
-        length -= 20;
     } else {
         if (length < 24) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
             return 0;
         }
-        length -= 24;
         pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
         if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
@@ -692,23 +690,23 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
             inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
         if (inlen <= 0) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
-            return NULL;
+            goto err;
         }
         enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
         if (!enctmp) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return NULL;
+            goto err;
         }
         if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
                             (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
-            return NULL;
+            goto err;
         p += saltlen;
         /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
         memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
         p += 8;
         if (keylen < 8) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
-            return NULL;
+            goto err;
         }
         inlen = keylen - 8;
         q = enctmp + 8;

libs/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c

@@ -75,15 +75,19 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
     if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
     if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
     safebag->value.bag = bag;
     safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
     return safebag;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag);
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 /* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
@@ -127,6 +131,7 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
           PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
                         p8))) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
         return NULL;
     }
 
@@ -144,14 +149,18 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
     p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
     if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
 
     if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
     return p7;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 /* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
@@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
     if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
                   PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
 
     pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
@@ -193,7 +202,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
 
     if (!pbe) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
     X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
     p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
@@ -202,10 +211,14 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
           PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
                                   passlen, bags, 1))) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
-        return NULL;
+        goto err;
     }
 
     return p7;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,

libs/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c

@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
     const unsigned char *pbuf;
     unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
 
+    if (cipher == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
     /* Extract useful info from parameter */
     if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
         param->value.sequence == NULL) {

libs/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c

@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
     }
     if (!saltlen)
         saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
-    p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
-    if (!(p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen))) {
+    if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
     }
+    p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
     if (!salt) {
         if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
             return 0;

libs/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c

@@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
             bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
         else {
             bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+            if (bio == NULL)
+                goto err;
             BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
         }
         if (bio == NULL)
@@ -1156,7 +1158,6 @@ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx)
     rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
     if (rsk == NULL)
         return NULL;
-    ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0);
     if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx)
         return (NULL);
     ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx);

libs/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
     X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
     char buf[4096];
     int i, j = 0, k, ret = 0;
-    BIO *p7bio;
-    BIO *tmpin, *tmpout;
+    BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+    BIO *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;
 
     if (!p7) {
         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
@@ -274,18 +274,12 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
         return 0;
     }
-#if 0
-    /*
-     * NB: this test commented out because some versions of Netscape
-     * illegally include zero length content when signing data.
-     */
 
     /* Check for data and content: two sets of data */
     if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) {
         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT);
         return 0;
     }
-#endif
 
     sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
 
@@ -295,7 +289,6 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
     }
 
     signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, certs, flags);
-
     if (!signers)
         return 0;
 
@@ -308,14 +301,12 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
                 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer,
                                          p7->d.sign->cert)) {
                     PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-                    sk_X509_free(signers);
-                    return 0;
+                    goto err;
                 }
                 X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&cert_ctx, "smime_sign");
             } else if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, NULL)) {
                 PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-                sk_X509_free(signers);
-                return 0;
+                goto err;
             }
             if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCRL))
                 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, p7->d.sign->crl);
@@ -328,8 +319,7 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
                          PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
                 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
                                    X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
-                sk_X509_free(signers);
-                return 0;
+                goto err;
             }
             /* Check for revocation status here */
         }
@@ -348,7 +338,7 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
         tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
         if (tmpin == NULL) {
             PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
+            goto err;
         }
     } else
         tmpin = indata;
@@ -398,15 +388,12 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
     ret = 1;
 
  err:
-
     if (tmpin == indata) {
         if (indata)
             BIO_pop(p7bio);
     }
     BIO_free_all(p7bio);
-
     sk_X509_free(signers);
-
     return ret;
 }
 

libs/openssl/crypto/ppccap.c

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 #if defined(__linux) || defined(_AIX)
 # include <sys/utsname.h>
 #endif
-#include <crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
 #include "ppc_arch.h"

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c

@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
 {
     const unsigned char *p;
     int plen;
-    if (alg == NULL)
+    if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL)
         return NULL;
     if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
         return NULL;

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
+extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                         BN_GENCB *cb);
 #endif
 
 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
         return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode())
-        return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+        return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 #endif
     return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 }

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c

@@ -218,14 +218,13 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
             memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
             *prm_len = 16;
             ret = 1;
-        } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
+        } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) {
             RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-        else
+        } else {
             ret = 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Special case: SSL signature */
-    if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        }
+    } else if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        /* Special case: SSL signature */
         if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
             RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
         else

libs/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c

@@ -521,12 +521,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
                           char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
 {
     int len;
-    char *result = NULL;
-    char *vf;
+    char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
     BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
     unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
     unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
     char *defgNid = NULL;
+    int vfsize = 0;
 
     if ((user == NULL) ||
         (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
@@ -564,22 +564,23 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
         goto err;
 
     BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
-    if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL))
+    vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
+    if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
         goto err;
     t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
 
-    *verifier = vf;
     if (*salt == NULL) {
         char *tmp_salt;
 
         if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
-            OPENSSL_free(vf);
             goto err;
         }
         t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
         *salt = tmp_salt;
     }
 
+    *verifier = vf;
+    vf = NULL;
     result = defgNid;
 
  err:
@@ -587,11 +588,21 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
         BN_free(N_bn);
         BN_free(g_bn);
     }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
+    OPENSSL_free(vf);
+    BN_clear_free(s);
+    BN_clear_free(v);
     return result;
 }
 
 /*
- * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
+ * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
+ * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
+ * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
+ * random salt.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
+ * BIGNUMS.
  */
 int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
                            BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
@@ -600,6 +611,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
     BIGNUM *x = NULL;
     BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+    BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
 
     if ((user == NULL) ||
         (pass == NULL) ||
@@ -614,10 +626,12 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
         if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
             goto err;
 
-        *salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+        salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+    } else {
+        salttmp = *salt;
     }
 
-    x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass);
+    x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
 
     *verifier = BN_new();
     if (*verifier == NULL)
@@ -631,9 +645,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
     srp_bn_print(*verifier);
 
     result = 1;
+    *salt = salttmp;
 
  err:
-
+    if (*salt != salttmp)
+        BN_clear_free(salttmp);
     BN_clear_free(x);
     BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
     return result;

libs/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c

@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
             if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
                                         TS_failure_info[i].code)) {
                 if (!first)
-                    strcpy(failure_text, ",");
+                    strcat(failure_text, ",");
                 else
                     first = 0;
                 strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text);

libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c

@@ -536,8 +536,6 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
     X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
     sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-    /* Check cache first */
-    idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
 
     /*
      * Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache

libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
             ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
             if (ok < 0)
-                return ok;
+                goto end;
             /*
              * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
              * again later.
@@ -347,14 +347,15 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
             ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 
             if (ok < 0)
-                return ok;
+                goto end;
             if (ok == 0)
                 break;
             x = xtmp;
             if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
                 X509_free(xtmp);
                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                return 0;
+                ok = 0;
+                goto end;
             }
             num++;
         }
@@ -752,6 +753,10 @@ static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
     int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
     char *name;
 
+    if (id->peername != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
+        id->peername = NULL;
+    }
     for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
         name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
         if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)

libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c

@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
     }
     if (paramid->peername)
         OPENSSL_free(paramid->peername);
+    paramid->peername = NULL;
     if (paramid->email) {
         OPENSSL_free(paramid->email);
         paramid->email = NULL;
@@ -165,7 +166,6 @@ static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
         paramid->ip = NULL;
         paramid->iplen = 0;
     }
-
 }
 
 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
@@ -176,13 +176,20 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
     param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *param);
     if (!param)
         return NULL;
-    paramid = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *paramid);
+    memset(param, 0, sizeof(*param));
+
+    paramid = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*paramid));
     if (!paramid) {
         OPENSSL_free(param);
         return NULL;
     }
-    memset(param, 0, sizeof *param);
-    memset(paramid, 0, sizeof *paramid);
+    memset(paramid, 0, sizeof(*paramid));
+    /* Exotic platforms may have non-zero bit representation of NULL */
+    paramid->hosts = NULL;
+    paramid->peername = NULL;
+    paramid->email = NULL;
+    paramid->ip = NULL;
+
     param->id = paramid;
     x509_verify_param_zero(param);
     return param;

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c

@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
                 goto err;
             }
             pol = POLICYINFO_new();
+            if (pol == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
             pol->policyid = pobj;
         }
         if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c

@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
         }
         tval.value = val->value;
         sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
+        if (sub == NULL)
+            goto memerr;
         if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
             goto err;
         if (!*ptree)

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * ([email protected])
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * ([email protected])
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -380,6 +380,14 @@ static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
         setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
 }
 
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+
 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
 {
     BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
@@ -499,7 +507,8 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
     if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
         x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
         /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
-        if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK)
+        if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+            !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
             x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
     }
     x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
@@ -538,14 +547,6 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
  * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
  */
 
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
-#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-
 static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
 {
     /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c

@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ static STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a,
     SCT *sct;
     unsigned char *p, *p2;
     unsigned short listlen, sctlen = 0, fieldlen;
+    const unsigned char *q = *pp;
 
-    if (d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, pp, length) == NULL)
+    if (d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, &q, length) == NULL)
         return NULL;
     if (oct->length < 2)
         goto done;
@@ -279,6 +280,7 @@ static STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a,
 
  done:
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+    *pp = q;
     return sk;
 
  err:

libs/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c

@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
     GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
     X509_NAME *name = NULL;
     int i;
-    int cnid;
+    int cnid = NID_undef;
     int alt_type;
     int san_present = 0;
     int rv = 0;
@@ -949,7 +949,6 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
         else
             equal = equal_wildcard;
     } else {
-        cnid = 0;
         alt_type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
         equal = equal_case;
     }
@@ -980,11 +979,16 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
         GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
         if (rv != 0)
             return rv;
-        if (!cnid
+        if (cnid == NID_undef
             || (san_present
                 && !(flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT)))
             return 0;
     }
+
+    /* We're done if CN-ID is not pertinent */
+    if (cnid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
     i = -1;
     name = X509_get_subject_name(x);
     while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, cnid, i)) >= 0) {

libs/openssl/e_os.h

@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
 #    include <sys/select.h>
 #   endif
 
-#   if defined(sun)
+#   if defined(__sun) || defined(sun)
 #    include <sys/filio.h>
 #   else
 #    ifndef VMS
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
 
 # endif
 
-# if defined(sun) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4)
+# if (defined(__sun) || defined(sun)) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4)
   /* include headers first, so our defines don't break it */
 #  include <stdlib.h>
 #  include <string.h>

libs/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c

@@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
             BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
             b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason;
             break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+            BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+            b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+            break;
         default:
             break;
         }

libs/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -1370,9 +1370,12 @@ int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
 {
     int ret;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-    if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+    BIO *wbio;
+
+    wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+    if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
         !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
-        ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+        ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
         if (ret < 0)
             return -1;
 

libs/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c

@@ -133,12 +133,14 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
 {
-    if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-        return (DTLSv1_client_method());
+    if (ver == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+        return DTLS_client_method();
+    else if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return DTLSv1_client_method();
     else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
-        return (DTLSv1_2_client_method());
+        return DTLSv1_2_client_method();
     else
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
 }
 
 IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
@@ -147,13 +149,13 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
                           dtls1_connect,
                           dtls1_get_client_method, DTLSv1_enc_data)
 
-    IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
                           DTLSv1_2_client_method,
                           ssl_undefined_function,
                           dtls1_connect,
                           dtls1_get_client_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
 
-    IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
                           DTLS_client_method,
                           ssl_undefined_function,
                           dtls1_connect,
@@ -315,13 +317,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
         case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-        case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
             s->shutdown = 0;
 
             /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
             ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
 
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
             dtls1_start_timer(s);
             ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
             if (ret <= 0)
@@ -366,11 +367,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
                              sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
                              DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
 
-                    SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                    if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
                                                sizeof(sctpauthkey),
                                                labelbuffer,
                                                sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
-                                               0);
+                                               0) <= 0) {
+                        ret = -1;
+                        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
 
                     BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
                              BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
@@ -378,6 +383,10 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
                     s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+                    if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+                        /* receive renewed session ticket */
+                        s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+                    }
                 } else
                     s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
             }
@@ -500,9 +509,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
             snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
                      DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
 
-            SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+            if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
                                        sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-                                       sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+                                       sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
+            }
 
             BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
                      sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);

libs/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c

@@ -64,12 +64,14 @@
 static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver);
 static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver)
 {
-    if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
-        return (DTLSv1_method());
+    if (ver == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+        return DTLS_method();
+    else if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+        return DTLSv1_method();
     else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
-        return (DTLSv1_2_method());
+        return DTLSv1_2_method();
     else
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
 }
 
 IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
@@ -77,12 +79,12 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
                           dtls1_accept,
                           dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_method, DTLSv1_enc_data)
 
-    IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
                           DTLSv1_2_method,
                           dtls1_accept,
                           dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
 
-    IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
                           DTLS_method,
                           dtls1_accept,
                           dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)

libs/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c

@@ -131,12 +131,14 @@ static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
 {
-    if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
-        return (DTLSv1_server_method());
+    if (ver == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+        return DTLS_server_method();
+    else if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+        return DTLSv1_server_method();
     else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
-        return (DTLSv1_2_server_method());
+        return DTLSv1_2_server_method();
     else
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
 }
 
 IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
@@ -145,13 +147,13 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
                           ssl_undefined_function,
                           dtls1_get_server_method, DTLSv1_enc_data)
 
-    IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
                           DTLSv1_2_server_method,
                           dtls1_accept,
                           ssl_undefined_function,
                           dtls1_get_server_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
 
-    IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
                           DTLS_server_method,
                           dtls1_accept,
                           ssl_undefined_function,
@@ -283,6 +285,19 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
                 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
                 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
                 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+            } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+                       !(s->options &
+                         SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+                /*
+                 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+                 * support secure renegotiation.
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,
+                       SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
             } else {
                 /*
                  * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
@@ -421,9 +436,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
                 snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
                          DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
 
-                SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
-                                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-                                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+                if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                        sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+                        sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+                    ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                    goto end;
+                }
 
                 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
                          sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
@@ -635,9 +654,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
             snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
                      DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
 
-            SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+            if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
                                        sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-                                       sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+                                       sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
+            }
 
             BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
                      sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);

libs/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c

@@ -375,12 +375,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
     buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
     if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
-#if 0
-        /* don't reuse session-id's */
+        /*
+         * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as
+         * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead
+         */
         if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
-            return (-1);
+            return -1;
         }
-#endif
 
         p = s->s3->client_random;
         if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
@@ -445,9 +446,6 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
             /*
              * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse)
              */
-#if 0
-            s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-#endif
             s2n(0, d);
 
             if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
@@ -738,6 +736,8 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
             goto err;
         }
 
+        s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+
         /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
         OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
 
@@ -796,13 +796,6 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
     }
     s->init_num = 0;
 
-    /*
-     * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a
-     * session-id
-     */
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
-        goto err;
-
     return (SSL_connect(s));
  err:
     return (-1);

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c

@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
     unsigned char *p;
     size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
 
-    if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
         headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
     else
         headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
     unsigned char *p;
     size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
 
-    if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
         headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
     else
         headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c

@@ -411,8 +411,9 @@ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
  * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
  * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
  * padding too. )
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
  */
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
                             unsigned char *md_out,
                             size_t *md_out_size,
                             const unsigned char header[13],
@@ -455,7 +456,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
 
     switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
     case NID_md5:
-        MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c);
+        if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
         md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
         md_transform =
             (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
@@ -464,7 +466,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
         length_is_big_endian = 0;
         break;
     case NID_sha1:
-        SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c);
+        if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
         md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
         md_transform =
             (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
@@ -472,14 +475,16 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
         break;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
     case NID_sha224:
-        SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
+        if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
         md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
         md_transform =
             (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
         md_size = 224 / 8;
         break;
     case NID_sha256:
-        SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
+        if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
         md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
         md_transform =
             (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
@@ -488,7 +493,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
     case NID_sha384:
-        SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
+        if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
         md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
         md_transform =
             (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
@@ -497,7 +503,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
         md_length_size = 16;
         break;
     case NID_sha512:
-        SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
+        if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
         md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
         md_transform =
             (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
@@ -513,8 +520,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
          */
         OPENSSL_assert(0);
         if (md_out_size)
-            *md_out_size = -1;
-        return;
+            *md_out_size = 0;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
@@ -652,7 +659,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
              */
             if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
                 /* Should never happen */
-                return;
+                return 0;
             }
             overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
             md_transform(md_state.c, header);
@@ -733,26 +740,34 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
     }
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-    EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ );
+    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
+        goto err;
     if (is_sslv3) {
         /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
         memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
 
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+        if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+            goto err;
     } else {
         /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
         for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
             hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
 
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+        if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+            goto err;
     }
     EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
     if (md_out_size)
         *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -1050,6 +1050,11 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
         goto f_err;
     }
+    /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
+    if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+        ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+    else
+        ct->mask_ssl = 0;
     /*
      * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
      * return an error.
@@ -1699,6 +1704,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         p += i;
 
+        if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+
         if (2 > n - param_len) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
             goto f_err;
@@ -1719,6 +1730,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         p += i;
 
+        if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
         if (2 > n - param_len) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
             goto f_err;
@@ -1740,6 +1756,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         p += i;
         n -= param_len;
 
+        if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
         if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
             pkey =
@@ -1935,14 +1956,20 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             q = md_buf;
             for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
                 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-                EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
-                                  ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
-                                 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
-                                 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
-                EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
+                if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+                                      (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
+                                      NULL) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
                 q += size;
                 j += size;
             }
@@ -1961,12 +1988,16 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         } else
 #endif
         {
-            EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-            EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
-                             SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-            EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
-                             SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-            EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
+            if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+                    || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
             if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
                 /* bad signature */
                 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
@@ -2208,6 +2239,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
     long n;
     const unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char *d;
+    unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
 
     n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                    SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,19 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 
     p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
+    n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
+    n2s(p, ticklen);
+    /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+    if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+    if (ticklen == 0)
+        return 1;
+
     if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
         int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
         SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
@@ -2257,14 +2302,6 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
         s->session = new_sess;
     }
 
-    n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
-    n2s(p, ticklen);
-    /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
-    if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-        goto f_err;
-    }
     if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
         OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
         s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
@@ -2275,6 +2312,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
         goto err;
     }
     memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+    s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
     s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
     /*
      * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
@@ -2462,6 +2500,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                     || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                            ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                     goto err;
                 }
                 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
@@ -2927,6 +2966,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
             pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
                                         X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+            if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
             /*
              * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
              *
@@ -2936,10 +2980,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
             /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
 
-            EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
-            /* Generate session key */
-            if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+            if (pkey_ctx == NULL
+                    || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+                    /* Generate session key */
+                    || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
                 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 goto err;
             }
             /*
@@ -2960,13 +3007,18 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
              * data
              */
             ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-            EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
-                           EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
-            EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
-                             SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-            EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
-                             SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-            EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
+            if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
+                               EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
+                    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+                EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
             EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
             if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
                 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
@@ -2982,7 +3034,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
             msglen = 255;
             if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
-                < 0) {
+                <= 0) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
                 goto err;
@@ -3177,7 +3229,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
         pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
         pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
-        EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
+        if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
         if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
             if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
@@ -3365,7 +3420,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
          * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
          * return(-1); We then get retied later
          */
-        i = 0;
         i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
         if (i < 0) {
             s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c

@@ -253,7 +253,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
         dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
 
-        ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m);
+        if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err2;
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
         /* COMPRESS */
         if (s->expand != NULL) {
@@ -288,7 +291,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
              */
             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
         dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m);
+        if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err2;
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
         /* COMPRESS */
         if (s->compress != NULL) {
@@ -691,19 +697,21 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
         return 0;
 
     npad = (48 / n) * n;
-    if (sender != NULL)
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
-                     s->session->master_key_length);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i);
-
-    EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
-                     s->session->master_key_length);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i);
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret);
+    if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len) <= 0)
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+                                s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i) <= 0
+
+            || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+                                s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ret = 0;
+    }
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
@@ -775,33 +783,36 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
 
         /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
-        ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
-                               md, &md_size,
-                               header, rec->input,
-                               rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-                               mac_sec, md_size, 1);
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+                                   mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+            return -1;
     } else {
         unsigned int md_size_u;
         /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 
-        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8);
         rec_char = rec->type;
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1);
         p = md;
         s2n(rec->length, p);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u);
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+            return -1;
+        }
         md_size = md_size_u;
 
         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
@@ -846,24 +857,31 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
     for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
-        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], strlen((const char *)salt[i]));
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n);
-
-        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n);
+        if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i],
+                                    strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n) <= 0
+
+                || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
         out += n;
         ret += n;
     }
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
-    if (s->msg_callback) {
+    if (ret > 0 && s->msg_callback) {
         s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
                         p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
         s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c

@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
 
 void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
 {
-    if (s == NULL)
+    if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL)
         return;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
             s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
             return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
         } else if (i <= 0) {
-            if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
                 /*
                  * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
                  * using a datagram service

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -383,7 +383,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                      */
                     if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-                    ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
                     ret = -1;
                     s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
@@ -902,7 +901,7 @@ int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 {
-    int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
+    int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
     unsigned int cookie_len;
     long n;
     unsigned long id;
@@ -1095,8 +1094,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
                 goto f_err;
             }
-            /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
-            ret = -2;
+            cookie_valid = 1;
         }
 
         p += cookie_len;
@@ -1231,7 +1229,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
     /* TLS extensions */
     if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
-        if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+        if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
             goto err;
         }
@@ -1466,8 +1464,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         }
     }
 
-    if (ret < 0)
-        ret = -ret;
+    ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
     if (0) {
  f_err:
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
@@ -1477,7 +1474,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
     if (ciphers != NULL)
         sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
-    return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
+    return ret;
 }
 
 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
@@ -1950,14 +1947,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
                     EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
                                          EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-                    EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
-                                      ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-                    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
-                                     SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
-                                     SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
-                    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
+                    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+                                          (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
+                                                     : s->ctx->sha1,
+                                          NULL) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
+                                              (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                               ERR_LIB_EVP);
+                        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        goto f_err;
+                    }
                     q += i;
                     j += i;
                 }
@@ -1985,16 +1990,17 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
                 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 #endif
-                EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
-                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
-                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
-                if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
-                                   (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+                if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+                        || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                          SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                          SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
+                        || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+                                         (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
-                    goto err;
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    goto f_err;
                 }
                 s2n(i, p);
                 n += i + 2;
@@ -2867,7 +2873,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
 
         pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
-        EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+        if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto gerr;
+        }
         /*
          * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
          * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
@@ -3099,7 +3113,17 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
         unsigned char signature[64];
         int idx;
         EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
-        EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+        if (pctx == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
         if (i != 64) {
             fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
         }

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl.h

@@ -2681,6 +2681,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC                 292
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC                                   134
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK                    238
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET                388
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST               135
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS                       289
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY                       136
@@ -2846,8 +2847,11 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK              106
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION                          107
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH                            108
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE                             375
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH                      109
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE                       393
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH                            110
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE                             395
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH                          111
 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE                          112
 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT                               304

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c

@@ -121,13 +121,16 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st {
 int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 {
 #define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
-    int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0, v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
+    int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0;
     unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2];
     unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2];
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
     int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0;
     unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    int v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
     unsigned char cbuf;
     int v11 = 0;

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c

@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
 
     memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
 
+    ret->references = 1;
     ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
     /*
      * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
@@ -325,7 +326,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
 #endif
     }
 
-    ret->references = 1;
     /*
      * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
      * will be set during handshake.

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c

@@ -376,10 +376,11 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
     const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
     int pkey_id = 0;
     ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1);
-    if (ameth) {
-        EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
+    if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                         ameth) > 0) {
+        return pkey_id;
     }
-    return pkey_id;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 #else
@@ -391,7 +392,9 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
     int pkey_id = 0;
     ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1);
     if (ameth) {
-        EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
+        if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                    ameth) <= 0)
+            pkey_id = 0;
     }
     if (tmpeng)
         ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
@@ -1404,15 +1407,16 @@ static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
                                     const char **prule_str)
 {
     unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0;
-    if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128"))
-        suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
-    else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY"))
+    if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) {
         suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
-    else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2")) {
+    } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) {
         suiteb_comb2 = 1;
         suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
-    } else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192"))
+    } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) {
+        suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+    } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) {
         suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
+    }
 
     if (suiteb_flags) {
         c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c

@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
      "ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "ssl3_enc"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET),
+     "ssl3_generate_master_secret"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
      "ssl3_get_certificate_request"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "ssl3_get_cert_status"},
@@ -386,8 +388,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
      "bad data returned by callback"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH), "bad dh g length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE), "bad dh g value"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH), "bad dh pub key length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE), "bad dh pub key value"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH), "bad dh p length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE), "bad dh p value"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE), "bad dsa signature"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"},

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c

@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     s->options = ctx->options;
     s->mode = ctx->mode;
     s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+    s->references = 1;
 
     if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
         /*
@@ -405,7 +406,6 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
         goto err;
 
-    s->references = 1;
     s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
 
     SSL_clear(s);
@@ -1980,7 +1980,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 
     ret->extra_certs = NULL;
     /* No compression for DTLS */
-    if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+    if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
         ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
 
     ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
@@ -3507,8 +3507,11 @@ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
 {
     ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
     *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-    if (md)
-        EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL);
+    if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+        *hash = NULL;
+        return NULL;
+    }
     return *hash;
 }
 

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h

@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
                                           unsigned char *limit, int *al);
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
-                                 unsigned char *d, int n);
+                                 unsigned char *limit);
 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
@@ -1439,15 +1439,15 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
                             SSL3_RECORD *rec,
                             unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
 char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-                            unsigned char *md_out,
-                            size_t *md_out_size,
-                            const unsigned char header[13],
-                            const unsigned char *data,
-                            size_t data_plus_mac_size,
-                            size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
-                            const unsigned char *mac_secret,
-                            unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                           unsigned char *md_out,
+                           size_t *md_out_size,
+                           const unsigned char header[13],
+                           const unsigned char *data,
+                           size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                           size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                           const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+                           unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
 
 void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
                            EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c

@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
     }
 
     RSA_up_ref(rsa);
-    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -195,6 +198,15 @@ static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
         EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
         pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+        if (pktmp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+         * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+         */
         EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
         EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
         ERR_clear_error();
@@ -396,6 +408,10 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
     }
 
     if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+         * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+         */
         EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
         ERR_clear_error();
 
@@ -516,7 +532,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
     }
 
     RSA_up_ref(rsa);
-    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -750,31 +769,31 @@ static int serverinfo_find_extension(const unsigned char *serverinfo,
     *extension_data = NULL;
     *extension_length = 0;
     if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0)
-        return 0;
+        return -1;
     for (;;) {
         unsigned int type = 0;
         size_t len = 0;
 
         /* end of serverinfo */
         if (serverinfo_length == 0)
-            return -1;          /* Extension not found */
+            return 0;           /* Extension not found */
 
         /* read 2-byte type field */
         if (serverinfo_length < 2)
-            return 0;           /* Error */
+            return -1;          /* Error */
         type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
         serverinfo += 2;
         serverinfo_length -= 2;
 
         /* read 2-byte len field */
         if (serverinfo_length < 2)
-            return 0;           /* Error */
+            return -1;          /* Error */
         len = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
         serverinfo += 2;
         serverinfo_length -= 2;
 
         if (len > serverinfo_length)
-            return 0;           /* Error */
+            return -1;          /* Error */
 
         if (type == extension_type) {
             *extension_data = serverinfo;
@@ -814,10 +833,12 @@ static int serverinfo_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
         /* Find the relevant extension from the serverinfo */
         int retval = serverinfo_find_extension(serverinfo, serverinfo_length,
                                                ext_type, out, outlen);
+        if (retval == -1) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            return -1;          /* Error */
+        }
         if (retval == 0)
-            return 0;           /* Error */
-        if (retval == -1)
-            return -1;          /* No extension found, don't send extension */
+            return 0;           /* No extension found, don't send extension */
         return 1;               /* Send extension */
     }
     return -1;                  /* No serverinfo data found, don't send

libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c

@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
     dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
     dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
 # endif
-#endif
     dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
     dest->srp_username = NULL;
 #endif
@@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
             goto err;
     }
 # endif
-#endif
 
     if (ticket != 0) {
         dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
@@ -334,6 +333,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
         dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
         dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
     }
+#endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
     if (src->srp_username) {

libs/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c

@@ -384,6 +384,8 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
         dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
         mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+        if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
         if (s->expand != NULL) {
             COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
@@ -422,11 +424,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
         if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
             mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-            if (!mac_ctx)
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL)
                 goto err;
             s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
-        } else
+        } else {
             mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
         if (s->compress != NULL) {
             COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
@@ -499,7 +504,12 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
     if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
         mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
                                        mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
-        EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
+        if (mac_key == NULL
+                || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
         EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
     }
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -931,8 +941,9 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
     }
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
+    if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
     return ((int)ret);
 }
@@ -1059,17 +1070,24 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
          * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
          */
         /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
-        ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
-                               md, &md_size,
-                               header, rec->input,
-                               rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-                               ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-                               ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
+            if (!stream_mac)
+                EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+            return -1;
+        }
     } else {
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
-        t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
-        OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+        if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+            if (!stream_mac)
+                EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+            return -1;
+        }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
         if (!send && FIPS_mode())
             tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,

libs/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
             } else
 # endif
             {
-                if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
+                if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
                     *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
                     pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
                 } else {
@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
  * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
  */
 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-                                 const unsigned char *d, int n)
+                                 const unsigned char *limit)
 {
     unsigned short type, size;
     static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
@@ -1866,11 +1866,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
     };
 
-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+    if (data >= (limit - 2))
         return;
     data += 2;
 
-    if (data > (d + n - 4))
+    if (data > (limit - 4))
         return;
     n2s(data, type);
     n2s(data, size);
@@ -1878,7 +1878,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
         return;
 
-    if (data + size > d + n)
+    if (data + size > limit)
         return;
     data += size;
 
@@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
 
-        if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
+        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
             return;
         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
             return;
@@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
     } else {
         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
 
-        if (data + len != d + n)
+        if (data + len != limit)
             return;
         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
             return;
@@ -1974,7 +1974,7 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
 }
 
 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-                                       unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+                                       unsigned char *limit, int *al)
 {
     unsigned short type;
     unsigned short size;
@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
-        ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+        ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
 # endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
     /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
@@ -2016,22 +2016,22 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 
     s->srtp_profile = NULL;
 
-    if (data == d + n)
+    if (data == limit)
         goto ri_check;
 
-    if (data > (d + n - 2))
+    if (data > (limit - 2))
         goto err;
 
     n2s(data, len);
 
-    if (data > (d + n - len))
+    if (data + len != limit)
         goto err;
 
-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
         n2s(data, type);
         n2s(data, size);
 
-        if (data + size > (d + n))
+        if (data + size > (limit))
             goto err;
 # if 0
         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
@@ -2405,7 +2405,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
     }
 
     /* Spurious data on the end */
-    if (data != d + n)
+    if (data != limit)
         goto err;
 
     *p = data;
@@ -2465,8 +2465,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
     return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
-                                 int n)
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+                                 unsigned char *limit)
 {
     int al = -1;
     unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
      * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
      * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
      */
-    if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
+    if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -2487,7 +2487,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
     }
 
     custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
-    if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
+    if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -3385,10 +3385,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
         /* Check key name matches */
         if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
             return 2;
-        HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-                     tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
-        EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-                           tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+        if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+                         tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                                      tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+                                      etick + 16) <= 0) {
+            goto err;
+       }
     }
     /*
      * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
@@ -3396,13 +3399,14 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
      */
     mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
     if (mlen < 0) {
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-        return -1;
+        goto err;
     }
     eticklen -= mlen;
     /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-    HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
-    HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+    if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+            || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+        goto err;
+    }
     HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
     if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
@@ -3413,11 +3417,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
     p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
     eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
     sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
-    if (!sdec) {
+    if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
         return -1;
     }
-    EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
     if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
         OPENSSL_free(sdec);
@@ -3450,6 +3453,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
      * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
      */
     return 2;
+err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+    return -1;
 }
 
 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */

libs/openssl/ssl/tls1.h

@@ -231,13 +231,12 @@ extern "C" {
 /* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat   15
 
-/* ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00 */
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC7301 */
 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16
 
 /*
  * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
- * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
- * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding
  */
 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding     21
 
@@ -262,20 +261,19 @@ extern "C" {
 #  define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg              13172
 # endif
 
-/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
+/* NameType value from RFC3546 */
 # define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
-/* status request value from RFC 3546 */
+/* status request value from RFC3546 */
 # define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
 
-/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */
 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first                      0
 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed               0
 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime  1
 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2  2
 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last                       2
 
-/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */
-
+/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */
 # define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous                      0
 # define TLSEXT_signature_rsa                            1
 # define TLSEXT_signature_dsa                            2
@@ -430,7 +428,6 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                0x03000066
 
 /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
-
 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                    0x0300002F
 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA                 0x03000030
 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                 0x03000031
@@ -595,7 +592,7 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA               "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA                   "ADH-AES256-SHA"
 
-/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
+/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */
 # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA               "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA            "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"