Merge branch 'thirdparty_hotfix' into hotfix

Source commit: 8b0825cba9b990b5711f46c6152b4529625c2280

libs/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c

@@ -234,6 +234,21 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
 
 int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
 {
+    /*
+     * One of the following must be true:
+     *
+     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
+     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
+     *
+     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
+     */
+    if (!((ameth->pem_str == NULL
+           && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
+          || (ameth->pem_str != NULL
+              && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0))) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (app_methods == NULL) {
         app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp);
         if (!app_methods)
@@ -305,18 +320,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
     } else
         ameth->info = NULL;
 
-    /*
-     * One of the following must be true:
-     *
-     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
-     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
-     *
-     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
-     */
-    if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
-          || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0)))
-        goto err;
-
     if (pem_str) {
         ameth->pem_str = BUF_strdup(pem_str);
         if (!ameth->pem_str)

libs/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c

@@ -361,12 +361,16 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
                 } else
                     _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
             }
-#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
             int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
             if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
                 setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
             else
                 setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+            int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+            if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+                setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
 #  endif
         }
         break;
@@ -389,11 +393,14 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
             ret = 0;
             break;
         }
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
         if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
             strcat(p, "b");
         else
             strcat(p, "t");
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+        if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+            strcat(p, "b");
 #  endif
 #  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
         if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c */
 /* Written by Ulf Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx)
     }
     /* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */
     BN_zero(ret);
+    /* clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME if leaked from previous frames */
+    ret->flags &= (~BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     ctx->used++;
     CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret);
     return ret;

libs/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c

@@ -836,6 +836,9 @@ int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
     int i;
     BN_ULONG aa, bb;
 
+    if (n == 0)
+        return 0;
+
     aa = a[n - 1];
     bb = b[n - 1];
     if (aa != bb)

libs/openssl/crypto/buildinf.h

@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@
   /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
   #define CFLAGS "compiler: cl  /MD /Ox /O2 /Ob2 -DOPENSSL_THREADS  -DDSO_WIN32  -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I. -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE    "
   #define PLATFORM "VC-WIN32"
-  #define DATE "Wed Nov 21 08:25:18 2018"
+  #define DATE "Tue Feb 26 15:50:38 2019"
 #endif
 #ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_BC_NT
   /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
   #define CFLAGS "compiler: bcc32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -O2 -ff -fp -DBN_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE    "
   #define PLATFORM "BC-NT"
-  #define DATE "Wed Nov 21 08:25:18 2018"
+  #define DATE "Tue Feb 26 15:50:38 2019"
 #endif

libs/openssl/crypto/constant_time_locl.h

@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
     return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
+ * wipe it if there was no actual error. |clear| is 1 or 0.
+ */
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

libs/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c

@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
 
     case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
         *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
-        return 2;
+        return 1;
 
     default:
         return -2;

libs/openssl/crypto/err/err.c

@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA);
 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STATE);
@@ -1156,3 +1157,40 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
     es->err_flags[es->top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK;
     return 1;
 }
+
+#ifdef UINTPTR_T
+# undef UINTPTR_T
+#endif
+/*
+ * uintptr_t is the answer, but unformtunately we can't assume that all
+ * compilers supported by 1.0.2 have it :-(
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE==64
+/*
+ * But we can't use size_t on VMS, because it adheres to sizeof(size_t)==4
+ * even in 64-bit builds, which means that it won't work as mask.
+ */
+# define UINTPTR_T unsigned long long
+#else
+# define UINTPTR_T size_t
+#endif
+
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+    int top;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    top = es->top;
+
+    es->err_flags[top] &= ~(0 - clear);
+    es->err_buffer[top] &= ~(0UL - clear);
+    es->err_file[top] = (const char *)((UINTPTR_T)es->err_file[top] &
+                                       ~((UINTPTR_T)0 - clear));
+    es->err_line[top] |= 0 - clear;
+
+    es->top = (top + ERR_NUM_ERRORS - clear) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+}

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h

@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          181
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          180
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
 # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

@@ -317,8 +317,9 @@ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
     return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0);
 }
 
-int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
-                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                    unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, int inl)
 {
     int i, j, bl;
 
@@ -380,6 +381,18 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     return 1;
 }
 
+int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+}
+
 int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 {
     int ret;
@@ -392,6 +405,12 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
     int n, ret;
     unsigned int i, b, bl;
 
+    /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
         ret = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
         if (ret < 0)
@@ -435,6 +454,12 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     int fix_len;
     unsigned int b;
 
+    /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+    if (ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
         fix_len = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
         if (fix_len < 0) {
@@ -451,7 +476,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     }
 
     if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
-        return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+        return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
 
     b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
     OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
@@ -463,7 +488,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     } else
         fix_len = 0;
 
-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
+    if (!evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
         return 0;
 
     /*
@@ -494,6 +519,13 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 {
     int i, n;
     unsigned int b;
+
+    /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+    if (ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     *outl = 0;
 
     if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {

libs/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_err.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/evp/evp_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -92,8 +92,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH),
      "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_size"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"},

libs/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000211fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000212fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q-fips  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2r-fips  26 Feb 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2r  26 Feb 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "bn_int.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 #ifndef RSA_NULL
 
@@ -397,6 +398,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         goto err;
     }
 
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
     if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
         blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
         if (blinding == NULL) {
@@ -431,11 +437,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         } else
             d = rsa->d;
 
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
-                                        rsa->n, ctx))
-                goto err;
-
         if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
                                    rsa->_method_mod_n))
             goto err;
@@ -587,8 +588,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
         goto err;
     }
-    if (r < 0)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(r >= 0);
 
  err:
     if (ctx != NULL) {

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                       const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 {
     int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
-    unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+    unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
     const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
     /*
      * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
@@ -148,8 +148,11 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
      * This does not leak any side-channel information.
      */
-    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
-        goto decoding_err;
+    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
     db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
@@ -158,26 +161,26 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if (flen != num) {
-        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        if (em == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
 
-        /*
-         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
-         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
-         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
-         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
-         * |from|.
-         */
-        memset(em, 0, num);
-        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-        from = em;
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
     }
+    from = em;
 
     /*
      * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
@@ -224,37 +227,50 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
      * concern.
      */
-    if (!good)
-        goto decoding_err;
-
     msg_index = one_index + 1;
     mlen = dblen - msg_index;
 
-    if (tlen < mlen) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-        mlen = -1;
-    } else {
-        memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
-        goto cleanup;
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+
+    /*
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
+    mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+    for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
     }
 
- decoding_err:
     /*
      * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
      * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
      */
     RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
            RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
  cleanup:
-    if (db != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
-        OPENSSL_free(db);
-    }
-    if (em != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
-        OPENSSL_free(em);
-    }
-    return mlen;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
+    OPENSSL_free(db);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }
 
 int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     int i;
     /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
     unsigned char *em = NULL;
-    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
     int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
 
     if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
@@ -218,40 +218,41 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * section 7.2.2.
      */
 
-    if (flen > num)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (num < 11)
-        goto err;
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
 
-    if (flen != num) {
-        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        if (em == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-        /*
-         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
-         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
-         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
-         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
-         * |from|.
-         */
-        memset(em, 0, num);
-        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-        from = em;
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
     }
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
+    }
+    from = em;
 
     good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
     good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
 
+    /* scan over padding data */
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
         unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
-        zero_index =
-            constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
-                                     zero_index);
+
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
         found_zero_byte |= equals0;
     }
 
@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
-    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
 
     /*
      * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
@@ -270,30 +271,35 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     mlen = num - msg_index;
 
     /*
-     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
-     * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
      */
-    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
 
     /*
-     * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
-     * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
-     * information at the API boundary.
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
      */
-    if (!good) {
-        mlen = -1;
-        goto err;
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
     }
 
-    memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
 
- err:
-    if (em != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
-        OPENSSL_free(em);
-    }
-    if (mlen == -1)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
-               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
-    return mlen;
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }

libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                            const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -101,57 +102,116 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     return (1);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
+ * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
+ */
 int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                              const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
 {
-    int i, j, k;
-    const unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
 
-    p = from;
     if (flen < 10) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
         return (-1);
     }
-    /* Accept even zero-padded input */
-    if (flen == num) {
-        if (*(p++) != 0) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-            return -1;
-        }
-        flen--;
+
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
     }
-    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-        return (-1);
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
     }
+    from = em;
+
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+    mask = ~good;
 
     /* scan over padding data */
-    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type */
-    for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
-        if (*(p++) == 0)
-            break;
-
-    if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
-               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
-        return (-1);
-    }
-    for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
-        if (p[k] != 0x03)
-            break;
-    }
-    if (k == -1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
-        return (-1);
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
+    threes_in_row = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+
+        threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
     }
 
-    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
-    j -= i;
-    if (j > tlen) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-        return (-1);
+    /*
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+     * also fails.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+
+    /*
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
     }
-    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
 
-    return (j);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }

libs/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -1309,6 +1309,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
             s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
             SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return (0);
         } else {
             al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

libs/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -1500,6 +1500,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
             s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
             SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return (0);
         } else {
             al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
@@ -1719,9 +1720,12 @@ int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
                                           * protocol_version alerts */
     if (desc < 0)
         return -1;
-    /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
-    if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
-        SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+    /* If a fatal one, remove from cache and go into the error state */
+    if (level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+        if (s->session != NULL)
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    }
 
     s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
     s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;

libs/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -3697,6 +3697,12 @@ int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
                          sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
 }
 
+static int tls12_get_hash_nid(unsigned char hash_alg)
+{
+    return tls12_find_nid(hash_alg, tls12_md,
+                          sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+}
+
 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
 {
     switch (hash_alg) {
@@ -3887,6 +3893,8 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     const EVP_MD *md;
     CERT *c = s->cert;
     TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
+    int mandatory_mdnid;
+
     if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
         return 0;
 
@@ -3918,6 +3926,18 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
          i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
         idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+        if (s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey) {
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
+                                                &mandatory_mdnid) == 2 &&
+                mandatory_mdnid != tls12_get_hash_nid(sigptr->rhash))
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * If EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() failed, don't pollute
+             * the error stack.
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
         if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
             md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
             c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;