| 12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364656667686970717273747576777879808182 | /* * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */#include <openssl/err.h>#include "ec_lcl.h"EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,                                 const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx){    const EC_METHOD *meth;    EC_GROUP *ret;#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)    /*     * This might appear controversial, but the fact is that generic     * prime method was observed to deliver better performance even     * for NIST primes on a range of platforms, e.g.: 60%-15%     * improvement on IA-64, ~25% on ARM, 30%-90% on P4, 20%-25%     * in 32-bit build and 35%--12% in 64-bit build on Core2...     * Coefficients are relative to optimized bn_nist.c for most     * intensive ECDSA verify and ECDH operations for 192- and 521-     * bit keys respectively. Choice of these boundary values is     * arguable, because the dependency of improvement coefficient     * from key length is not a "monotone" curve. For example while     * 571-bit result is 23% on ARM, 384-bit one is -1%. But it's     * generally faster, sometimes "respectfully" faster, sometimes     * "tolerably" slower... What effectively happens is that loop     * with bn_mul_add_words is put against bn_mul_mont, and the     * latter "wins" on short vectors. Correct solution should be     * implementing dedicated NxN multiplication subroutines for     * small N. But till it materializes, let's stick to generic     * prime method...     *                                              <appro>     */    meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();#else    if (BN_nist_mod_func(p))        meth = EC_GFp_nist_method();    else        meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();#endif    ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);    if (ret == NULL)        return NULL;    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);        return NULL;    }    return ret;}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2MEC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx){    const EC_METHOD *meth;    EC_GROUP *ret;    meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method();    ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);    if (ret == NULL)        return NULL;    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);        return NULL;    }    return ret;}#endif
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