openssl: add fixes for CVE-2009-1387 and CVE-2009-2409 (thx, puchu)

SVN-Revision: 19369

package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/270305
+
+fix from upstream
+
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -585,30 +585,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+-	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+-	if ( frag == NULL)
+-		goto err;
++	if (frag_len)
++	{
++		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
++		if ( frag == NULL)
++			goto err;
+ 
+-	memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
++		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ 
+-	if (frag_len)
+-		{
+-		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
++		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */
+ 		i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ 			frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+ 		if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ 			goto err;
+-		}
+ 
+-	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+-	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
++		pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
++		pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
+ 
+-	item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
+-	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+-	if ( item == NULL)
+-		goto err;
++		item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
++		pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
++		if ( item == NULL)
++			goto err;
++
++		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++	}
+ 
+-	pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ 
+ err:

package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/280591
+
+fix from upstream
+
+http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=18260
+
+--- a/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
+@@ -64,9 +64,6 @@
+ 
+ void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void)
+ 	{
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+ 	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4());
+ #endif
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -986,7 +986,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT
+ 	while (n >= 0)
+ 		{
+ 		ctx->error_depth=n;
+-		if (!xs->valid)
++
++		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
++		 * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
++		 */
++		if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
+ 			{
+ 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
+ 				{
+@@ -996,13 +1000,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT
+ 				if (!ok) goto end;
+ 				}
+ 			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+-				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
+-				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
+-				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
+-				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
+-				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
+-				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
+-				 * been declared trusted. */
+ 				{
+ 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ 				ctx->current_cert=xs;
+--- a/ssl/ssl_algs.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+@@ -92,9 +92,6 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
+ 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ 	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
+ 	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");