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- From 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
- From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
- Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:04:02 +0200
- Subject: [PATCH] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
- Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
- (RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
- to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
- paper.
- This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
- some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
- sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
- Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
- Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
- to remove the host limit in the future.
- v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
- Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
- Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
- Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
- Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
- Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
- Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
- Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
- Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
- Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
- ---
- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
- --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
- +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
- @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_most
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
-
- /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
- -int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
- +int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
-
- int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
- int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
- @@ -3427,7 +3427,7 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
- static u32 challenge_timestamp;
- static unsigned int challenge_count;
- struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
- - u32 now;
- + u32 count, now;
-
- /* First check our per-socket dupack rate limit. */
- if (tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
- @@ -3435,13 +3435,18 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
- &tp->last_oow_ack_time))
- return;
-
- - /* Then check the check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
- + /* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
- now = jiffies / HZ;
- if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
- + u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
- +
- challenge_timestamp = now;
- - challenge_count = 0;
- + WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, half +
- + prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit));
- }
- - if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
- + count = READ_ONCE(challenge_count);
- + if (count > 0) {
- + WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, count - 1);
- NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
- tcp_send_ack(sk);
- }
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